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Comments

EVIDENCE-WHETHER WITNESS' PRIOR VOLUNTARY
TESTIMONY CONSTITUTES WAIVER OF
PRIVILEGE OF SELF-INCRIMINATION
IN SECOND TRIAL OF SAME CASE

Whether a witness' voluntary testimony to incriminating matters at a prior trial constitutes a waiver of his privilege against selfincrimination at a later trial of the same case has been the subject
of dicta in many cases.' While admitting the question is a close one
and not free from doubt, 2 a majority of courts would find that a
witness can reassert his privilege at the later trial.3 Wigmore is in
accord; 4 other writers5 and the American Law Institute on EvidenceG suggest that a witness should not be permitted to reassert
1. The precise question under consideration here involves five elements: (1) an ordinary witness (2) who testifies voluntarily (3) at a
previous trial (4) then refuses to testify at a later trial of (5) the same
case. The cases cited hereafter lack at least one of these elements, and
therefore are used only as dicta in relation to the present question. See
discussion in text infra at p. 90.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Malone, 111 F. Supp. 37, 38 (N.D. Cal.
1953); United States v. Steffen, 103 F. Supp. 415, 417 (N.D. Cal. 1951);

State v. De Cola, 33 N.J. 335, 344, 164 A.2d 729, 733 (1960).
3. See text at p. 88 infra.
4. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2276(4) at 471-72 (McNaughton rev.
1961)

[hereinafter cited as J. WiGMORE].
5. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 130 at 274 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
C. McCoRMICK]; 1 S. THOMPSON, TRIALS § 647 at 603 (2d ed. 1912).
6. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 37 and identical Rule 231 of
the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942):
A person who would otherwise have a privilege to refuse to disclose or to prevent another from disclosing a specified matter has
no such privilege with respect to that matter if the judge finds
that he or any other person while the holder of the privilege
(a) contracted with anyone not to claim the privilege or,
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his privilege. The precise question has been raised in the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Kubacki.7 There, a convicted
bawdy house operator testified at a first trial that she had paid
extortion money to the defendant. A conviction was obtained almost exclusively on the basis of her testimony. An appeal was
taken and a new trial granted.8 At the second trial, the witness
refused to testify on the ground her answers might incriminate
her.9 The case was abruptly dismissed. 10 It is foreseeable that
under the view existing in most states today,1' the same result
would be reached if the situation arose again. The purpose of this
Comment is to examine the strength of the majority view and to
investigate arguments and methods for preventing the recurrence
of the Kubacki result.
IN SUPPORT OF WAIVER

It has been argued that courts would be encouraging injustice
by allowing witnesses to reassert their privilege against self-incrimination at each new trial of a case: "[T] he force of the machinery
of government once set in motion should not be nullified by permitting a witness to withhold essential testimony. 1 2 Witnesses
may also be subject to threats and bribes between trials in an effort
to silence them on matters about which they had previously spoken
freely.' 3 This fear is not academic. The New Jersey Supreme
(b)

without coercion and with knowledge of his privilege, made
disclosure of any part of the matter or consented to such a
disclosure made by any one.
7. Nos. 67 and 68, December Sessions, 1964, Berks County Court of
Quarter Sessions. Second trial held June, 1967 (same docket numbers).
8. Commonwealth v. Kubacki, 208 Pa. Super. 523, 224 A.2d 80 (1966).
New trial granted on procedural point unrelated to present question.
9. At the time of the first trial, the witness was awaiting sentence
on her conviction for operating a bawdy house; by the time of the second
trial, she had already served her sentence for that conviction. This may
have had some relation to her change of mind between trials.
10. The district attorney, realizing that without the witness' testimony
he could not prove his case, moved that the case be dismissed. The motion was granted.
11. See text at p. 88 infra.
12. Note, Evidence-Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 32 ILLINOIS
L. REV. 117, 118 (1937).
See also, Samuel v. People, 164 Ill. 379, 45 N.E.
728 (1896):
[A] man ought not to be permitted to set the machinery of the law
in motion, and then afterwards turn the prosecution into naught by
withholding his evidence.
Id. at 382, 45 N.E. at 729 (contention made by prosecuting attorney).
13. In re Mark, 146 Mich. 714, 716-17, 110 N.W. 61, 62 (1906) (contention that claim by witness that his answers would tend to criminate him
was "a mere pretext not made in good faith, but for the dishonest purpose

Court in State v. De Cola1 4 said "the greater the original insult
to the public, the greater will be the inducement to 'persuade' the
witness to seek the sanctuary of a fabricated claim [of privilege].',15
Other courts, while appreciating the frustration of prosecuting
attorneys, feel the danger of spurious privilege claims is outweighed by a consideration for a witness' constitutional rights. 16
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said in United States v.
7
Miranti:1
"The Constitution is for the despicable as well as for
the admirable." '
But, by protecting a witness' privilege against
self-incrimination, a court may at the same time be hurting the
defendant. A recalcitrant witness may hold the key to a defendant's innocence as well as his guilt. 9 Furthermore, it can be
of protecting a confederate"); State v. De Cola, 33 N.J. 335, 164 A.2d 729
(1960):
The problem is confounded by the thought that the claim of
privilege may be spurious; that because of bribe, threat or a purpose to favor another, a witness who speaks . . . may later assert

the privilege to cloak nothing but a refusal to repeat the truth.
Id. at 349, 164 A.2d at 736; Commonwealth v.Turner, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 11
(1953):

To decide that under the present facts the former testimony is

inadmissible would make it possible for a witness who has been
intimidated or bribed to obstruct and defeat the administration of
justice by his silence. Such a result should not be reached if it can
be avoided without unfairness to defendant.
Id. at 14-15; See generally C. McCoRMmcK, EVIDENCE, supra note 5 § 130
at 274:
A mechanical limitation has been placed upon the application of
this doctrine of waiver. This limitation is calculated to encourage
culprits to bribe and intimidate witnesses against them to change
their testimony. This is the restriction that the waiver by disclosure
of incriminating facts is strictly confined in effect to the very proceedings in which the first testimony is given.
14. 33 N.J. 335, 164 A.2d 729 (1960).
15. Id. at 349-50, 164 A.2d at 736.
16. United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1957): Samuel v.
People, 164 Ill. 379, 45 N.E. 728 (1896); In re Contempt of Myers and Brei,
83 Pa. Super. 383 (1924):
We realize fully that the exercise of this privilege may sometimes
make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to secure a conviction of
crime, and to that extent it may hinder the courts of justice; but
... [c]onstitutional rights are not to be set aside or disregarded
whatever may be the effect of such action on a particular case.
Id. at 394.
17. 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1957).
18. Id. at 141.
19. State v. De Cola, 33 N.J. 335, 164 A.2d 729 (1960):
[A]t a trial concerning others, the need for justice to the litigants
understandably tends to loom above the seemingly more remote
value, the privilege of the witness; and since disclosure of only a
part may garble the truth and be more mischievous than no testimony at all, there is pressure to expand whatever "waiver" may
have occurred. In sum total, the rule that a witness may assert the
privilege . . .had led to attrition of the very privilege it was in-

tended to protect.
Id. at 345, 164 A.2d at 734; Commonwealth v. Turner, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 11
(1953):

"If

. .

. the former testimony would tend to exculpate defendant,

we cannot believe that it would be excluded." Id. at 15. See Note, Evidence-Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 32 ILIMNOIS L. REV. 117 (1937):
[T]he interest of the public-and even that of the accused-seems
to demand that the force of the machinery of government once
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argued that the witness does not need the protection of the
privilege after freely testifying on a prior occasion. The purpose of
the privilege, which is to prevent compulsion of criminating evidence against one's self, ceases to exist with the witness' voluntary
testimony at the first trial. His prior evidence can readily be
proved against him in the form of a transcript of his testimony at
any later criminal proceeding against him. 20 Repeating his testi21
mony at a second trial subjects him to no greater peril.
Some courts disagree with this reasoning. A federal district
court in California said in United States v. MaZone 22 that repetition
of previous testimony adds to its credibility and hence makes it
more incriminating against the witness. 2' Furthermore, by testiset in motion should not be nullified by permitting a witness to
withhold essential testimony.
Id. at 118.
20. See generally, C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 130 at
274.
21. Schlotterer v. Brooklyn & N.Y. Ferry Co., 89 App. Div. 508, 85
N.Y.S. 847 (2d Dept. 1903): "[I]f the patient once permit the physician to
testify, there is no longer any reason at any time for excluding competent
testimony under the plea of public policy." Id. at 609, 85 N.Y.S. at 848;
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 398 Pa. 237, 157 A.2d 207 (1960):
This statement could clearly be used against the witness in her
own trial, on charges pending against her ....
How then could
her answer, under oath, as a witness in the present case, more
completely incriminate her? The answer is it could not.
Id. at 242, 157 A.2d at 210 (trial judge's contention); Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Grat.) 624 (1873):
[I]t has been earnestly argued that . . . the witness has already
made elsewhere a full and voluntary disclosure of the facts, and
that nothing he could now say would do more to criminate him
than has been done already by that statement.
Id. at 636. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 130 at 274:
If he has already given material evidence of his own guilt, such
evidence, in the form of a transcript of his testimony, or of a
signed affidavit, can readily be proved against him if he is tried
for the crime. The present testimony will not add to his hazard
except as additional facts or details are brought out.
See also Note, Evidence-Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 32 IL INOIS
L. REV. 117 (1937):
[A]ny protection from prosecution that the privilege might give
him has already been dissipated by his previous disclosures. True,
admissions made by a witness may subsequently be admitted
against him in his own trial but repetition of statements already
made and available as evidence against him would seem to subject a witness to no greater peril on this score.
Id. at 118.
22. 111 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
23. [T]he mere repetition under oath of the same identical facts
would tend to incriminate. To ask a witness to say the same thing
twice, that is, to say the same thing here that he may have said
before the grand jury, is itself incriminatory in character. The
repetition adds to the incrimination. It adds to the weight of the
evidence which the government might present if he were subse-

fying at a second trial a witness may open himself to additional
questions and new fields of inquiry, particularly
on cross-exam24
ination, which will further incriminate him.

Further disagreement with the waiver argument is based on
the sanctity of a witness' privilege. Courts have repeatedly said
that respect for the privilege against self-incrimination outweighs
all other considerations. 25 Prior incriminating testimony should
quently tried upon a criminal offense.
Id. at 39. See also, United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1957)
("[R]eiteration adds to the credibility of the statement. .. .
24. United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1957):
[D]uring the period between the successive proceedings conditions
might have changed creating new grounds for apprehension (e.g.,
the passage of new criminal laws) or that the witness might be
subject to different interrogation for different purposes at the subsequent proceeding.
Id. at 140; United States v. Malone, 111 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1953):
The extent of the examination and cross-examination to which the
witness might be subjected, if he were compelled to testify . . . is
uncertain. The court has not the omnipotence to know in advance
where the questions and answers will lead. Undetermined and undefined fields of inquiry, beyond those touched upon at the grand
jury investigation, may be entered. The court could not circumscribe the cross-examination, other than to keep it within the general scope of the direct examination.
Id. at 39; United States v. Steffen, 103 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Cal. 1951):
[O]therwise he would subject himself to a new cross-examination
and be required under new and changed conditions to give testimony that may not have been anticipated or intended in subjecting
himself to examination as a witness in a prior and different proceeding.
Id. at 417; Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Lybrend, 99 Ga. 421, 27 S.E. 794
(1896):
He may on one occasion have had reasons for speaking out which
were entirely satisfactory to himself; and on the next he may have
been influenced to keep silent by other reasons which were, in his
opinion, equally cogent.
Id. at 440, 27 S.E. at 800; State v. De Cola, 33 N.J. 335, 164 A.2d 729 (1960):
"[I]ntervening circumstances may suggest a liability not theretofore in
view." Id. at 346, 164 A.2d at 735; People v. Cassidy, 213 N.Y. 288, 107
N.E. 713 (1915).
25. See United States v. Malone, 111 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1953):
"[Ilt could not provide a lawful basis for depriving the witness of his constitutional privilege." Id. at 38; Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Lybrend, 99
Ga. 421, 27 S.E. 794 (1896): "The privilege is in the highest degree personal, and is a sacred one, which the courts should jealously guard." Id. at
440, 27 S.E. at 800: Samuel v. People, 164 Ill. 379, 45 N.E. 728 (1896):
The privilege which a witness has, of refusing to give evidence
which will criminate himself, is granted to him upon grounds of
public policy, and as one of the safeguards of his personal liberty.
It cannot be regarded as released or waived by some disclosure,
which he may have made elsewhere, and under other circumstances.
Id. at 383, 45 N.E. at 728-29; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 398 Pa. 237, 157 A.2d
207 (1960):
The constitutional privilege is not like a coat which may be taken
off and thrown away. It is as much a part of the accused as his
skin and may not be stripped away by himself or by others. It
is an inviolable power accorded him in exchange for what he surrenders in being a member of the society of the Commonwealth.
Of course, he may, if he so desires, testify against himself, but the
constitutional privilege continues to remain with him, and the fact
that he has willingly admitted circumstances adverse to his own
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be ignored and the second proceeding regarded as completely new
and independent. 6 Most of these courts rely on the 1873 Virginia
case of Cullen v. Commonwealth.27 That case concerned whether
a witness testifying at a coroner's inquest waived his privilege
against self-incrimination at a subsequent grand jury hearing. The
Virginia court stated:
If, as we have held to be the case, a full disclosure of the
facts might tend to criminate the witness, we cannot see
how that tendency is at all removed by showing that the
witness had elsewhere made a statement tending to criminate him. The question before us is not what the witness
may have said elsewhere; but whether, when it is apparent
that a disclosure from him may tend to criminate him, he
shall now, in a pending trial, be compelled to make that
disclosure, although he claims his constitutional right of
refusal. We do not see that his 28
statements elsewhere have
anything to do with the question.
The purpose of the Cullen decision, as well as the many decisions
endorsing it,29 is to protect the witness. However, according to McCormick:

"The rule .

.

. protects chiefly the person accused of

crime, and gives very little protection to the witness."8 0 It may also
be added that "[a] privilege, the only purpose of which is to protect
the innocent, cannot justifiably be extended to shield one who
should be punished." 3'
Some courts have reached a waiver result without applying a
waiver theory." They have done this by admitting into evidence
witnesses' prior testimony, either by having stenographers' records
read in court,83 or by having other witnesses testify as to what the
interests can never be made the basis for compelling him to make
further admissions.
Id. at 243, 157 A.2d at 210-11.
26. See, e.g., Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Lybrend, 99 Ga. 421, 27
S.E. 794 (1896):
The second trial is a de novo investigation before another jury,
whose duty it is to consider the case in the light only of the evidence adduced at that hearing; and to allow the witness to assert
his privilege could result in no undue advantage or injustice to
either party to the cause.
Id. at 441, 27 S.E. at 800-01.
27. 65 Va. (24 Grat.) 624 (1873).
28. Id. at 637.
29. See note 59 infra.
30.

C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 130 at 274.

31. Note, Evidence-Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 32 ILLNOIS
L. REV. 117 at 118 (1937).
32. See notes 33-42 infra and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Johnson v. People, 384 P.2d 454 (Col. Sp. Ct. 1963)
(official court reporter permitted to testify, by use of stenographic notes
from prior trial); State v. Simmons, 78 Kan. 872, 98 P. 277 (1908) (testi-

original witnesses said on the prior occasions.8 4 They also have
compelled witnesses to testify under threat of contempt.35 If a
witness wishes to avoid the penalties of contempt and decides to
repeat his prior testimony, a defendant has no ground for complaint
even though the court's contempt ruling may have been improper.8 6
The privilege is personal to the witness and can only be raised by
7
him
A second rationale reaching the waiver result regards the witness' two different testimonial appearances as successive phases of a
single proceeding 8 This approach has not gained much acceptmony from first trial, properly identified and reduced to writing, intro-

duced at second trial); People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681
(1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 937 (1955) (transcript of testimony at preliminary hearing read into evidence at trial); Exleton v. State, 30 Okla. Cr.
224, 235 P. 627 (1925) (same). See also p. 94 infra.
34. See, e.g., McCoy v. State, 221 Ala. 466, 129 S. 21 (1930) (when
witness refused to testify, another witness was permitted to give in evidence
his account of what the first witness had said at a preliminary examination); Woodward v. State, 21 Ala. App. 417, 109 S. 119 (1926)(three witnesses present at a former trial testified as to what the now-silent witness had said).
35. Overend v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. 280, 63 P. 372 (1900) (witness
who refused to answer questions he had answered at a preliminary examination was given three contempt orders and committed to county jail; one
of three contempt orders affirmed); People ex rel. Hofsaes v. Warden of
City Prison, 302 N.Y. 403, 98 N.E.2d 579 (1951) (police inspector's answers
as to gift from bookmaker deemed so evasive, inconsistent and incredible as
to be tantamount to a refusal to answer; he was given contempt order,
which was affirmed).
36. State v. Van Winkle, 80 Iowa 15, 45 N.W. 388 (1890):
If his privilege was denied him wrongfully, the wrong was to the
witness and not to the defendant and the testimony was admissible as to the defendant, though it might not thereafter be used
against the witness.
Id. at 20-21, 45 N.W. at 390; see generally 4 B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 864 (4th
ed. 1958):
If a witness is improperly compelled to answer, his testimony may
not be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution; the
statements are regarded as having been given under compulsion and duress.
Id. at 1625, citing United States v. Kimball, 117 F. 156 (1902); Boone v.
People, 148 Ill. 440, 36 N.E. 99 (1894); State v. Bailey, 54 Iowa 414, 6 N.W.
589 (1880); State v. Gardner, 88 Minn. 130, 92 N.W. 529 (1902); Horstman
v. Kaufman, 97 Pa. 147 (1881). "But the refusal of a witness to answer has
been held to be competent against him in a civil action," citing Andrews v.
Frye, 104 Mass. 234 (1870).
37. Samuel v. People, 164 Ill. 379, 45 N.E. 728 (1896):
The privilege belongs exclusively to the witness, who may take
advantage of it or not at his pleasure. If ordered to testify in a
case where he is privileged, it is a matter exclusively between the
court and the witness. The latter may stand out, and be committed for contempt, or he may submit; but the party has no right
to interfere or complain of the error.
Id. at 387, 45 N.E. at 730.
38. See Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1956) (two
different grand jury appearances regarded as one proceeding); United
States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1942) (same); Loubriel v. United
States, 9 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1926) (same); Lorattis v. Kulka, 1 Ill. 2d 533,
116 N.E.2d 329 (1953) (civil action regarded as one continuous proceeding);
Stalder v. Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 107 N.E.2d 696 (1953) (same); State v. Van
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ance, however, since it is unrealistic. 9 In United States v. Field,40
the second circuit stated that a relinquishment of a constitutional
privilege in one proceeding did not constitute a relinquishment in a
later proceeding; 4' yet the court went ahead and acted as if the
privilege was permanently waived by holding that the witness was
obliged both to produce records and answer questions auxiliary to
42
their production.
A few courts have forthrightly held that a witness' prior testimony constituted a permanent waiver of his privilege against selfincrimination. In Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh43 a witness testiWinkle, 80 Iowa 15, 45 N.W. 388 (1890); State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 117
A.2d 499 (1955).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1957):
Two appearances before the same grand jury separated by indictment and conviction for crimes related to the original disclosures and the passage of nearly a year should not be characterized
as a single proceeding and the original waiver should not still be
effective. The passage of time and the events occurring between the two appearances render the proceedings separate for the
purposes of the waiver rule.
Id. at 140; In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953):
The Government . .
asserts that the grand jury investigation
and subsequent trial were merely two successive phases of a single
proceeding so that a waiver carried through. We cannot accede to
this proposition, however.
Id. at 152; Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Lybrend, 99 Ga. 421, 27 S.E.
794 (1896):
There is, however, no necessity or reason for extending this rule to
cover a case where a witness voluntarily testifies as to privileged
matters upon one trial, and subsequently, at a second and entirely different trial, claims his privilege of giving no testimony
whatever in regard thereto. The second trial is a de novo investigation before another jury, whose duty it is to consider the case in
the light only of the evidence adduced at that hearing, and to allow
the witness to assert his privilege could result in no undue advantage or injustice to either party.
Id. at 441, 27 S.E. at 800-01; People v. Rockola, 339 Ill. 474, 171 N.W. 559
(1930); Samuel v. People, 164 Ill. 379, 45 N.E. 728 (1896); People v. Walker,
28 Ill.
2d 585, 192 N.E.2d 819 (1963) (hearing, grand jury and trial regarded
as separate proceedings); Duckworth v. District Court, 220 Iowa 1350, 264
N.W. 714 (1936):
The only possible basis for such a holding would be on the theory
that the trial of the case in court was a continuation of the investigation begun in the grand jury room and was a part of the same
matter, and having testified once in the same case, he could not
later claim the privilege. But this basis is not sound in principle.
Id. at 1364, 264 N.W. at 722; State v. De Cola, 33 N.J. 335, 164 A.2d 729
(1960).
See generally, Note, Evidence-Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 32 ILLINoIs L. REv. 117, 118 ("[R]ealistically it is difficult to conceive
statements made in separate proceedings as being parts of one narrative.
. , 2 ).

40.
41.
42.
43.

193
Id.
Id.
159

F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1951).
at 110.
at 111.
Pa. Super. 113, 46 A.2d 579 (1946).

fied in a prior equity proceeding as to funds allegedly obtained by
fraud. She then tried to assert her privilege in a later criminal
prosecution for conversion. The Pennsylvania Superior Court said
when the defendant waived her privilege in the equity case, the
waiver became "irrevocable and she was without right to assert the
privilege belatedly in the instant criminal proceeding. . .. 44 The
same court in Commonwealth v. TTacey 45 stated:
Remaining silent whenever it reasonably appears that the
testimony of a witness may result in self-incrimination is a
personal privilege, and since it is but a privilege, it may be
waived .... A waiver may result from former acts, e.g. by
And the privilege
... the giving of testimony ....
when once waived cannot be reagainst self-incrimination
46
asserted.
In State v. Burrel147 the Montana Supreme Court held that a
bankrupt's waiver of his privilege before a referee precluded him
from objecting to incriminating questions in a subsequent criminal
case. A New York appellate court, in Schlotterer v. Brooklyn &
4s
held that where the plaintiff waived her
New York Ferry Co.,
physician's disqualification on a former trial between the same
parties, such waiver was binding on her in a subsequent suit for the
same cause: "If the patient once voluntarily renounces the pro'49
tection of the statute, his waiver is everlasting and irrevocable.
Similar pronouncements have been made by the Kansas Supreme
Court in State v. Simmons,50 and by the Iowa Supreme Court in
2
State v. Knight51 and State v. Van Winkle.r
MAJORITY VIEW: No WAIVER

The majority of courts, though by dicta,53 have rejected the
44. Id. at 119, 46 A.2d at 582.
45. 137 Pa. Super. 221, 8 A.2d 622 (1939).
46. Id.at 225, 8 A.2d at 624.
47. 27 Mont. 282, 70 P. 982 (1902), aff'd, 194 U.S. 572 (1903).
48. 89 App. Div. 508, 85 N.Y.S. 847 (1903).
49. Id. at 509, 85 N.Y.S. at 848.
50. 78 Kan. 852, 98 P. 277 (1908): "[I]f the accused waives his privilege and takes the witness stand in his own behalf at any stage of the
prosecution, he waives it at every subsequent stage." Id.at 853, 98 P. at
278.
51. 204 Iowa 819, 216 N.W. 104 (1927): "These witnesses had previously given their testimony before the grand jury and thereby waived the
right, if any existed, to refuse to testify." Id.at 823-24, 216 N.W. at 107.
52. 80 Iowa 15, 45 N.W. 388 (1890):
[T]he witness testified before the grand jury in this case, and
there disclosed without claiming his privilege; therefore, he ought
not to be permitted to claim it here. These rulings are fully supported by the authorities.
Id. at 20, 45 N.W. at 390. See generally 4 B. JONES, EWDoNCE, supra note 36,
§ 864 at 1625: "[I]t has been held that a waiver at one trial of a cause
operates as a waiver of the privilege at a subsequent trial thereof. .. "
citing Crum v. Brock, 136 Miss. 858, 101 S. 704 (1924) and 38 HARV. L. REv.
1122.
53. See note 1 supra.
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view that a witness waives his privilege by testifying at an earlier
trial.5 4 As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals said in United
States v. Goodman:5 "A waiver of the privilege must occur in the
same proceeding in which it is sought to be invoked." 56 At first
glance, the no-waiver holdings appear to form a well-established
rule of law. However, upon a close examination, it can be seen that
only a few courts have soundly supported their decisions.5 7 Most
have either made blank, unsupported statements,58 or have merely
quoted cases and textbooks which themselves lacked sound reasoning.5 9

54. See generally text at pp. 82-84 supra.
55. 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1961).
56. Id. at 259.
57. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1961):
"It has been uniformly held that a prior disclosure to investigating officials cannot constitute a waiver of the privilege with respect to the same
matter in a subsequent legal proceeding." Id. at 259; United States v.
Malone, 111 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1953); Poretto v. United States, 196 F.2d
392 (5th Cir. 1952):
The constitutional privilege attaches to the witness in each particular case in which he is called upon to testify, without reference
to his declaration at some other time or place or in some other
proceeding.
Id. at 394; Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Lybrend, 99 Ga. 421, 27 S.E. 794
(1896):
A party often waives at one trial what he has an undoubted right
to object to at a subsequent hearing of the same case. . . . We
therefore conclude that Lybrend's right as a witness to decline answering the objectionable questions was not lost because, as a
party swearing in his own behalf, he had on a previous trial answered similar questions without objection.
Id. at 441-42, 27 S.E. at 801.
59. The first pronouncement on the issue was made in Cullen v.
Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Grat.) 624 (1873). See discussion in text accompanying notes 27 and 28 supra. It was repeated in Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 897 (1881)
("These sound views [given in the
Cullen case] may be applied verbatim et literatim to the case before us.")
Together, these two cases have formed the foundation for the rule that a
waiver at one proceeding does not extend into another. They have been
quoted repeatedly in other cases. See, e.g., Overend v. Superior Court,
131 Cal. 280, 63 P. 372 (1900); Samuel v. People, 164 Ill. 379, 45 N.E. 728,
729 (1896); Commonwealth v. Phoenix Hotel Co., 157 Ky.180, 162 S.W. 823,
826 (1914); In re Mark,146 Mich. 714, 110 N.W.61, 62 (1906).
The Cullen and Temple cases also have been heavily relied upon by
Wigmore and Am. Jur. See their statements at note 65 infra. Their statements, in turn, have been cited repeatedly by later cases. See, e.g.,
People v. Walker, 28 Ill. 2d 585, 192 N.E.2d 819 (1963); Duckworth v. District Court, 220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.W. 715 (1936); and People v. Cassidy, 213
N.Y. 288, 107 N.E. 713 (1915) -all relying on Wigmore; see also In re Neff,
206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953); Commonwealth v. Phoenix Hotel Co., 157 Ky.
180, 162 S.W. 823 (1914); and Apodaca v. Viramontes, 53 N.M. 513, 212 P.2d
425 (1949)-all relying on Am.Jur.

Even assuming the majority of courts have been correct, it can
be argued their decisions should not control the issue raised in the
Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Kubacki. In Kubacki, five
elements were present: (1) an ordinary witness (2) who testifies
voluntarily (3) at a previous trial (4) then refuses to testify at a
later trial (5) of the same case. No other case could be found containing all five elements.60 The element most predominantly missing was that of a previous trial. In most cases, witnesses' prior testimony had been given at hearings, 61 coroners' inquests,6 2 grand jury
investigations, 63 or other types of preliminary proceedings.6 4 Cases
frequently cited to support the majority view are Cullen v. Commonwealth, 5 Temple v. Commonwealth,6 Duckworth v. District
Court,67 Apodaca v. Viramontes,68 and In re NeffJ.9 In Cullen, a
witness first testified freely at a coroner's inquest, then invoked his
60. The search included a check of 38 cases cited by Wigmore, McCormick, and Am. Jur. and some 20 cases cited by other cases.
61. See Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (1942) (police court hearing); Overend v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. 280, 63 P. 372 (1900) (preliminary
examination); State v. Woods, 130 Kan. 492, 287 P. 248 (1930) (preliminary
examination); State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 P. 489 (1911) (preliminary
hearing); People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681 (1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 937 (1955) (preliminary examination); In re Mark, 146 Mich. 714,
110 N.W. 61 (1906) (ex parte preliminary examination); Burdy v. Conroy,
182 Misc. 476, 48 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1944) (felony court hearing); Commonwealth
v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 133 A.2d 187 (1957) (magistrate's hearing); Miskimmins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411 (1899) (preliminary hearing).
62. See Tuttle v. People, 33 Col. 243, 79 P. 1035 (1905); State v. Meyer,
181 Iowa 440, 164 N.W. 794 (1917); State v. Allison, 116 Mont. 352, 153
P.2d 141 (1944); State v. O'Brien, 18 Mont. 1, 43 P. 1091 (1903); In re Contempt of Myers and Brei, 83 Pa. Super. 383 (1924); Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Grat.) 624 (1873).
63. See In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Malone, 111 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1953); Ex parte Sales, 134 Cal. App. 54, 24
P.2d 916 (1933); People v. Tavernier, 318 II. App. 622, 48 N.E.2d 551,
reversed, 384 Ill. 388, 51 N.E.2d 528 (1943); Duckworth v. District Court, 220
Iowa 1350, 264 N.W. 715 (1936); People v. Walker, 28 Ill. 2d 585, 192 N.E.2d
819 (1963); State v. Iosue, 220 Minn. 283, 19 N.W.2d 735 (1945); Apodaca v.
Viramontes, 53 N.M. 513, 212 P.2d 425 (1949); People v. Kramer, 257 App.
Div. 598, 14 N.Y.S.2d 161 (4th Dept. 1939); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 398
Pa. 237, 157 A.2d 207 (1960); Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892 (1881).
64. A voir dire examination, which is a special inquiry before a court
to determine the admissibility of evidence, was involved in People v. Lawrence, 168 Cal. App. 2d 510, 336 P.2d 189 (1959); a peace bond proceeding
in Wyatt v. State, 35 Ala. App. 147, 46 So. 2d 837 (1950), cert. denied, 46
So. 2d 847. Incriminating statements were given in signed affidavits in
Jeffries v. United States, 215 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1954) and Samuel v. People,
164 Ill. 379, 45 N.E. 728 (1896); the initial statement was made in a deposition in Boston Marine Ins. Co. v. Slocovitch, 55 N.Y. Super. 452 (1888);
initial statements were made orally to federal agents in United States v.
Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1961), United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d
135 (2d Cir. 1957), and Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.

1952).

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

65 Va. (24 Grat.) 624 (1873).
75 Va. 892 (1881).
220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.W. 715 (1936).
53 N.M. 513, 212 P.2d 425 (1949).
206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953).
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privilege at a subsequent grand jury hearing.70 In the others,
witnesses initially testified at grand jury investigations, then
asserted their privileges at subsequent trials. Yet these cases have
been relied upon by Wigmore and others to support the proposition
that a witness testifying at a former trial regains his privilege at a
71
later trial.
Holdings that witnesses do not waive their privileges in grand
jury-trial or inquest-trial situations does not warrant an extension
of the rule to trial-trial situations. A former trial can easily be
distinguished from preliminary proceedings such as grand jury
hearings or coroners' inquests. A witness at a preliminary proceeding often is not fully advised of his rights; he is not given the
opportunity to be represented by counsel, nor is there opportunity for cross-examination. 72 Under these circumstances, it may
be conceded that a waiver should not be permanently binding
on the witness. However, when the prior incriminating testimony is made at a formal trial, the witness is fully advised of his
rights and given the opportunity to be represented by an attorney and cross-examined. Perhaps there is then justification to not
permit him to claim his privilege at a later trial of the same case. 73
70. 65 Va. (24 Grat.) 624 (1873). See notes 27, 28 supra and accompanying test.
71. Wigmore first states that a witness' "voluntary testimony before a
coroner's inquest, or a grand jury, or other preliminary and separate proceeding, . . . is . . . not a waiver for the main trial." Then, in the next
sentence, he adds: "Nor is his testimony at a first trial a waiver for a later
trial." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE supra note 4, § 2276 (4) at 471-72 (emphasis in original).
58 AM. JUR., Witnesses, § 99 (1948) states:
A person who has waived his privilege of silence in one trial or
proceeding is not estopped to assert it as to the same matter in a
subsequent trial or proceeding. The privilege attaches to the witness in each particular case in which he may be called on to testify,
and whether or not he may claim it is to be determined without
reference to what he said when testifying as a witness on some
other trial, or on a former trial of the same case and without
reference to his declarations at some other time and place.
Id. at 82.
72. There is less chance for these circumstances to exist since Miranda. However, such circumstances were common in the pre-Miranda
cases cited to support the majority view.
73. Courts are concerned that a witness testifies under oath, with
knowledge of his rights, with opportunity for counsel, and with opportunity
for cross-examination in open court. Where one of these factors is absent,
they are hesitant to find a binding waiver. See, e.g., Wood v. United
States, 128 F.2d 265 (1942):
It is sufficient to rule that when, as here, the accused is without
counsel and it does not appear clearly that he knows his rights and
intends to waive them, the "plea" or its substantial equivalent,
made without warning or advice, cannot be received in evidence
against him. Any othe rule would make of the hearing a trap and

As the court in Commonwealth v. Fisher74 said: "The crucial part
of any criminal prosecution is the trial. . ..
Some of the same
cases so heavily-relied upon to support the no-waiver rule clearly
suggest that a different rule should exist in a trial-trial situation.
The Duckworth case 76 states: "The hearing before the grand jury
is secret ex parte. What is said there the public is not privileged to
hear. That is of an entirely different nature than a public trial in
8
open court. '77 This view is reinforced by In re Neff: 7
"75

The grand jury is not a judicial tribunal but rather an
informing or accusing body. While an appendage of the
court it does not conduct its proceedings judicially and
when after its secret ex parte investigation it finds and
returns to the court an indictment against a defendant, its
function with respect to that defendant is ended. It is
clear, therefore, that the investigation of a grand jury is a
proceeding which is wholly separate and distinct from,
and of a different nature than, the subsequent trial. ....79
Another distinguishable element in the Kubacki situation is
that an ordinary witness had given the prior incriminating testimony. In some cases forming the majority view, the defendant is
the one testifying. This is true in People v. Arnold,80 State v.
Simmons,81 United States v. Malone8 2 and United States v. Stefan inquisition, with consequences for the accused and for the judiciary system not tolerable under the Constitution.
Id. at 268; Wyatt v. State, 35 Ala. App. 147, 46 So. 2d 837, cert. denied, 46
So. 2d 847 (1950); State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 P. 489 (1911); State
v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189 (1880); People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d
681 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 937 (1955); State v. Allison, 116 Mont.
352, 153 P.2d 141 (1944).
74. 398 Pa. 237, 157 A.2d 207 (1960) (incriminating testimony given at
grand jury hearing).
75. Id. at 242, 157 A.2d at 210.
76. Duckworth v. District Court, 220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.W. 715 (1936).
77. Id. at 1364, 264 N.W. at 722.
78. 206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953).
79. Id. at 152. See also, Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (1942);
"[T]he hearing is inquisitorial in a broad sense. But its purpose is not to
convict. That is the trial court's function. Id. at 268; People v. Lawrence,
168 Cal. App. 2d 510, 336 P.2d 189 (1959):
The voir dire examination was in the nature of a special inquiry
before the court to determine the admissibility of evidence, properly conducted outside the presence of the jury, not limited to evidence that would be admissible at the trial of the issue of guilt.
Id. at 517, 336 P.2d at 194; State v. Allison, 116 Mont. 352, 153 P.2d 141
(1944):
A coroner's inquest has been broadly defined as a tribunal charged
with the duty of investigating crimes, and, more specifically, as an
investigation into the cause of death by a coroner with the aid of a
jury ....

Although an inquest is essentially a criminal proceed-

ing, at least from the time when the felonious homicide is established, nevertheless, it is not a trial involving the merits, but
rather a preliminary investigation.
Id. at 355, 153 P.2d at 142-43.
80. 43 Mich. 303, 5 N.W. 385 (1880).
81. 78 Kan. 872, 98 P.277 (1908).
82. 111 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1953) (co-conspirator).
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fen.83 McCormick explains why a different rule should apply
when an ordinary witness is involved:
An ordinary witness has no privilege to decline altogether
to testify, and by taking the stand he waives nothing. The
accused is in a vastly different position. He4 has an option
to stay off the stand altogether, or to testify.
Since a defendant's privilege can be more easily lost at a first trial
by his merely taking the stand, it can be argued that the privilege
should be more easily revived at the second trial."" An ordinary
witness, on the other hand, does not easily lose his privilege, and
thus should not easily regain it once it is waived.
A final distinction between Kubacki and cases forming the
majority rule is that in Kubacki the two trials involved the same
case. The parties and issues were identical on both occasions. This
was not true in other cases, including Commonwealth v. Phoenix
Hotel,8 6 United States v. Vadner,87 United States v. Poretto,8
United States v. Steffen,89 People v. Cassidy9 ° and People v. ArnoldY1 In these cases the witnesses were asked to testify to matters
which they had previously testified to in other cases. Again,
different waiver rules are necessary since circumstances between
two succeeding cases involving different parties and issues may be
92
very different.
83. 103 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Cal. 1951). Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v.
Lybrend, 99 Ga. 421, 27 S.E. 794 (1896), another frequently-cited case in
support of the majority view, was a civil case in which the witness Lybrend, was a party to the action.
84. C. McCoRmIcK, EvmEC, supranote 5, § 131 at 274.
85. Id. See also State v. De Cola, 33 N.J. 335, 164 A.2d 729 (1960):
[A]t a trial concerning others, the need for justice to the litigants
understandably tends to loom above the seemingly more remote
value, the privilege of the witness; and since disclosure of only a
part may garble the truth and be more mischievous than no testimony at all, there is pressure to expand whatever "waiver" may

have occurred.

Id. at 345, 164 A.2d at 734.
86. 157 Ky. 180, 162 S.W. 823 (1914).
87. 119 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
88. 196 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1952).
89. 103 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
90. 213 N.Y. 288, 107 N.E. 713 (1915).
91. 43 Mich. 303, 5 N.W. 385 (1880).
92. See, e.g., Wyatt v. State, 35 Ala. App. 147, 46 So. 2d 837, cert.
denied, 46 So. 2d 847 (1950):
[E]vidence given at a former trial is admissible only if the issues
and parties are substantially the same . . . [and] the testimony
given under oath before a tribunal or officer having legal
authority to take testimony and affording in practice an opportunity for cross-examination, and so presented that the party
against whom the witness was offered had an opportunity to test
its credit by cross-examination.
Id. at 154, 46 So. 2d at 843. See also, note 24 supra and accompanying text.

ADMISSION OF RECORD FROM FIRST TRIAL

If a court refuses to hold that a witness waives his privilege,
it is possible to obtain the same result as a waiver by admitting into
evidence at the later trial a record of the prior testimony. 8 Most
states have "availability statutes" providing for the admission of
prior trial records in certain defined situations. These include
where the witness has died, become incompetent, become ill, or left
the jurisdiction since his initial testimony. 4 The situation where a
witness refuses to testify is not explicitly provided for in these
statutes.9 5 However, with a broad interpretation, recalcitrant wit93. See Bridges v. Alabama, 26 Ala. App. 1, 152 So. 51 (1933); McCoy
v. State, 221 Ala. 466, 129 So. 21 (1930); Woodward v. State, 21 Ala. App.
417, 109 So. 119 (1926); Johnson v. People, 384 P.2d 454 (Col. Sp. Ct. 1963);
Habig v. Bastian, 117 Fla. 864, 158 So. 508 (1935); State v. Stewart, 85 Kan.
404, 116 P. 489 (1911); People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681
(1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 937 (1955); Exleton v. State, 30 Okla. Crim.
224, 235 P. 627 (1925); Commonwealth v. Turner, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 11 (1953).
See also notes 31 and 32 supra.
94. See McCoy v. State, 221 Ala. 466, 129 So. 21 (1930):
[I]t seems to be reasonably well settled, although the authorities
are not entirely uniform, that if the right of cross-examination has
been exercised, or full opportunity afforded thereto, such evidence
is admissible: (1) where the witness is dead; (2) is insane or
mentally incapacitated; (3) is shown to be beyond the seas; (4) is
kept away by the contrivance of the opposite party; (5) has gone
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or his personal attendance is
unobtainable by the exercise of due diligence; and (6) where the
witness is alive, and his personal attendance may be obtained, if he
has been rendered incompetent as a witness by subsequently occurring facts for which the party offering the testimony is not responsible, and over which he had no control.
Id. at 468, 129 So. at 23; Johnson v. People, 384 P.2d 454 (Col. Sp. Ct. 1963):
The general rule at the common law was that where a witness who
had testified at a prior trial was unavailable at the time of the
second trial his testimony at the former trial once properly authenticated was admissible in the latter trial.
Id. at 457; State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 413-14, 116 P. 489, 493 (1911);
People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681 (1954), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 937 (1955):
Testimony taken at an examination, preliminary hearing, or at
a former trial of the case, or taken by deposition at the instance
of the defendant, may be used by the prosecution whenever the
witness giving such testimony can not, for any reason, be produced
at the trial, or whenever the witness has, since giving such testimony become insane or otherwise mentally incapacitated to testify.
Id. at 302-03, 63 N.W.2d at 685, quoting C.L. 1948 § 768.26, Stat. Ann.
§ 28.1049; Exleton v. State, 30 Okl. Cr. 224, 235 P. 627 (1925); Commonwealth v. Turner, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 11 (1953):
[W]henever any person has been examined as a witness, either for
the Commonwealth or for the defense, in any criminal proceeding
conducted in or before a court of record and that defendant has
been present and has had an opportunity to examine or crossexamine if such witness afterwards die, or be out of the jurisdiction so that he cannot be effectively served with a subpoena, or if
he cannot be found or if he become incompetent to testify for any
legally sufficient reason, properly proven testimony of his examination shall be competent evidence upon a subsequent trial of the
same criminal issue.
Id. at 12-13, quoting 19 P.S. § 582.
95. See generally, 5 J. WIoMORE, § 1413 at 184-89 (3d ed. 1940) where
most states' statutes are listed.
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nesses might be impliedly included, by treating them as unavailable witnesses. Such an interpretation was applied by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Pickett:9
Availability . . . must be broadly construed in the context
in which it is found. This word does not mean physical
presence alone, but is definitive of 'having sufficient force
or efficacy for the object,' which object in this instance is
the attainment of justice
through the admission of the wit97
ness' former testimony.
Other courts have agreed with Pickett, holding that a witness who
refuses to testify at a later trial places himself in the same position
as if he were dead, incompetent, or beyond the reach of the court's
process 8 Yet it seems unrealistic to regard a witness as unavailable if he is present in the courtroom at the second trial and
physically and mentally competent to testify. This argument was
met by the leading case of the Kansas Supreme Court in State v.
Stewart.9 9 The court distinguished the availability of a witness
from the availability of his testimony. It held that the "availability
statutes" were aimed at the testimony and not the witness: 100
The principle upon which . . . former testimony should be
resorted to is the simple principle of necessity, i.e., the
absence of any other means of utilizing the witness' knowledge. If his testimony given anew in court cannot be had,
it will be lost entirely for the purposes of doing justice if it
is not received in the form in which it survives and can
be had. The only inquiry, then, need be, is his testimony
in court unavailable?' 01
96. 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 937
(1955).
97. Id. at 306, 63 N.W.2d at 687.
98. See, e.g., Bridges v. State, 26 Ala. App. 1, 152 So. 51 (1933); Woodward v. State, 21 Ala. App. 417, 109 So. 119 (1926).
99. 85 Kan. 404, 116 P. 489 (1911).
100. Id. at 414-15, 116 P. at 493. See also, Woodward v. State, 21 Ala.
App. 417, 109 So. 119 (1926):
Having elected to testify, his evidence given upon the first trial
was competent and legal. Upon the second trial, upon intimation
or by instruction from the court, he availed himself of his constitutional right not to testify. By this action his testimony was not
available to the state, through no fault of the state, and so far as the
effect of his refusal to testify is concerned made his testimony
which he had formerly given as inaccessible to the state as if he
had been dead or out of the jurisdiction of the court. . . . [T]he
admissibility does not depend so much on the presence or availability of the witness as it does on the availability of the testimony; and . . . the testimony, when he reserved the right not to
testify, was just as unavailable as if he had moved permanently
from the state, or if he had died.
Id. at 419, 109 So. at 121.
101. State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 413, 116 P. 489, 493 (1911).
See
also, Johnson v. People, 384 P.2d 454 (Col. Sp. Ct. 1963):

The Stewart court further stated that considerations of logic and
justice demanded such an interpretation of the statutes. 102 Other
courts have agreed with Stewart, but caution that in order to be
admitted, the previous testimony must be made under oath, under
with full opportunity for crossthe supervision of a judge, and
03
examination by the defendant.
Textbook writers have flatly stated that records of prior testimony can be admitted in later trials.10 4 However, this rule is not so
well-established as they would make it appear. The Oklahoma
Criminal Court of Appeals in Exleton v. State 05 said: "There is
some diversity of authority on the admissibility of evidence where
The true test was not so much the "unavailability" of the witness,
but the"unavailability" of his testimony and that a witness whothough present-refused to testify is just as surely "unavailable" as
the witness who stepped across a state line to avoid service of a
subpoena.
Id. at 457.
102. State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 P. 489 (1911):
If a witness cannot prevent the use of his testimony by stepping
outside the jurisdiction of the court, or the acquiring of an interest
or other act which disqualifies him as a witness, it would appear
that he cannot defeat the use of testimony given when he was
competent, and which was reduced to writing, by claiming a statutory privilege and refusing to testify viva voce when called to the
witness stand ....

All the requirements of the law were satisfied

when the testimony of Stewart was taken, and when he refused
to testify his former competent testimony, which was in legal form,
was as admissible as if he had been dead or beyond the reach of the
court's process.
Id. at 415-16, 116 P. at 494; see also, Woodward v. State, 21 Ala. App. 417,
109 So. 119 (1926):
The object of the rule is apparent, and is to arrive at the truth and
do justice. It would certainly tend to an opposite result, if, as to
testimony carefully taken upon a former trial, at which the accused was represented by counsel, who was permitted the right of
cross-examination, such rule did not prevail.
Id. at 418, 109 So. at 120; People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294 (1954), 63 N.W.2d
681, 687 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 397 (1955).
103. See, e.g., Habig v. Bastian, 117 Fla. 864, 158 So. 508 (1935):
The better reasoning is that the testimony of a witness at a former
trial, where it is taken under the sanctity of an oath, under the
supervision of the judge where the opposite party has full opportunity for cross-examination, is treated as a deposition which may
be read in evidence on a second trial of the same case.
Id. at 870-71, 158 So. at 511; State v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189 (1880):
The two essentials, the oath and the right to cross-examination,
existed in this case. There was a judicial proceeding to which
the defendant was a party. The testimony was given under oath.
The defendant had a right to be present, was in fact represented
by counsel, and could have cross-examined fully and without
limit or restraint.
Id. at 195,
104. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 95, § 1409(10) at 163-64:
A disqualification .

.

. by the exercise of a privilege, makes the

witness' present testimony unavailable, and hence should suffice
to allow resort to his deposition or former testimony. This doctrine .

.

. was well established in English chancery practice, and

this would probably be generally followed in our courts.
See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 234 at 495: "[I]f the witness exercises a privilege not to testify at all ... the witness is properly regarded
as unavailable."
105. 30 Okl. Cr. 224, 235 P. 627 (1925).
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the witness can be personally present and is not physically unable
to testify."10 6 The Alabama Court of Appeals in Woodward v.
State'0 7 agreed: "[A]vailable authorities [are] more or less out
08
of harmony."'
Leading a minority view against the admission of testimony
from a prior trial are the courts of Pennsylvania and California.
In Commonwealth v. Turner,0 9 a Philadelphia County court first
held that Pennsylvania's "availability statute"" 0 should be liberally construed so as to permit the admission of testimony from a
witness who between trials decided to become silent."' However,
on appeal, 112 Pennsylvania's supreme court categorically rejected
that decision, holding:
Lofton was not an unavailable witness either within the
letter or the spirit of the act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158. Not
only was he then present in the 1courtroom
but was actually
13
on the witness stand at the time.
A similar ruling was handed down by the California Court of Appeals in People v. Lawrence:"4
We find no error in the court's refusal to allow defendant
to read to the jury .

.

. testimony.

It is not a case which

admits testimony given on a former trial by a witness who
is deceased, insane, out of the jurisdiction, or who cannot
106. Id. at 229, 235 P. at 628.
107. 21 Ala. App. 417, 109 So. 119 (1926).
108. Id. at 420, 109 So. at 120.
109. 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 11 (Phila. 1953).
110. Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, § 3, 19 P.S. § 582, quoted in note

94 supra.
111. In a well-reasoned, but eventually-overruled decision, the county
court said:
To decide that under the present facts the former testimony is inadmissible would make it possible for a witness who has been intimidated or bribed to obstruct and defeat the administration of
justice by his silence. Such a result should not be reached if it can
be avoided without unfairness to the defendant. If we had the
converse situation, and the former testimony would tend to exculpate the defendant, we cannot believe that it would be excluded.
There is no better reason in logic or fairness why such testimony
should be inadmissible when offered by the Commonwealth. The
parties are identical and the defendant is represented by the same
counsel, who very ably cross-examined the witness at the third
trial. The actual presence or absence of the witness in court is
immaterial. The vital fact is the availability of the testimony.
When Lofton was on the stand and refused to testify, even after
being held in contempt of court, his testimony was not available
and the notes of his prior testimony taken in open court, subject
to confrontation and cross-examination are admissible.
Commonwealth v. Turner, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 11, 14-15 (1953).
112. Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 133 A.2d 187 (1957).
113. Id. at 250, 133 A.2d at 192.

114. 168 Cal. App. 2d 510, 336 P.2d 189 (1959).

with due diligence be found within the state. Obviously,
the witness did not come within any of the quoted exceptions. He was physically present in the court room. His
failure to testify stemmed merely from his legal right to
assert his privilege against self-incrimination, not because
of death, insanity, absence from jurisdiction or lack of anybody's inability to find him. Defendant would have us
read the statute as if it said that the former testimony can
be used if the witness is unavailable for any reason not
chargeable to the party calling him. That simply cannot
be done. It would amount to a re-writing of the statute,
a legislative not a judicial function.""
Also following this minority view is the New Hampshire Supreme
Court in Hayward v. Barron."6 Courts favoring this view appear
to be concerned that a broad interpretation of the "availability
statutes," which would make a witness "unavailable" even though
he were present in the courtroom and physically and mentally
competent to testify, is simply an unrealistic construction of the
statutes.117 If the legislatures intended recalcitrant witnesses to
be included in the list of unavailable witnesses, they would have
explicity provided for them in the statutes.118
In the final analysis, it appears that the admission into evidence of a prior trial's record has been employed as a substitute for
compelling a witness to testify in person. The substitute, however,
is a poor one. When a record of testimony is read in court, the defendant does not have an opportunity to confront the witness and
the jury does not have an opportunity to observe him and fully
appraise his credibility. Since the witness is available in the courtroom and competent to testify, the better evidence is his oral testimony. This can be obtained by compelling him to testify, at least
to the same matters which he freely and voluntarily testified to at
a previous trial. Such compulsion can be based on the theory that
his prior incriminating testimony constituted a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimnaton. But courts are reluctant to extend a prior waiver into a later proceeding." 9 This is due primarily
to the sanctity courts place on the privilege against self-incrimination. But if courts are willing to have the prior record of a witness' testimony admitted at a later trial, they should be willing to
compel the witness to testify in person. The witness' privilege is
not protected any further by having his prior incriminating statements read in open court than by having him testify orally at the
new trial.

115. Id. at 518, 336 P.2d at 194.
116. 38 N.H. 366 (1859).
117. See People v. Lawrence, 168 Cal. App. 2d 510, 336 P.2d 189 (1959);
Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 133 A.2d 187 (1957).
118. Id.

119. See p. 88 supra.
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CONCLUSION

Whether an ordinary witness waives his privilege against selfincrimination at a second trial by having testified at a first trial of
the same case has been discussed by dicta in many cases. A minority view would find that a witness waives his privilege on the
rationale that a witness who already has testified freely at one
trial no longer needs protection against self-incrimination. Also,
allowing him to reassert his privilege will cause him to become
subjected to threats and bribes between trials.
The apparent majority view-that a witness does not waive his
privilege-is based on three arguments: (1) the privilege against
self-incrimination is too sacred to be permanently waived; (2)
repetition of prior testimony may be further incriminating to the
witness; and (3) new fields of incriminating inquiry may be opened
if the witness is required to testify at the second trial. A court
applying the majority view may still obtain the minority's result
by admitting into evidence at the second trial a record of the first
trial's testimony. This can be done by regarding the witness as an
"unavailable witness." However, such a broad interpretation of
the "availability statutes" is unrealistic and defeats the purposes
for retaining the majority view. If a court wants to obtain the
prior testimony, the better solution would be to forthrightly adopt
the minority view, holding that a waiver in one trial carries into
the next. Then, the witness can be compelled to repeat his prior
incriminating testimony while confronting the defendant and jury.
Before compelling repetition of the prior testimony, the court
should make certain that the witness was aware of his rights at the
first trial and that there was an opportunity for cross-examination.
Furthermore, the court should limit the waiver at the second trial
to the same matters explored at the first trial.
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